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Developing Virtue and Practical
Wisdom in the Legal Profession
and Beyond
by Mark L. Jones*

*C2016 Mark L. Jones. Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law; Co-director,
Mercer University Phronesis Project for the Exploration of Character, Practical Wisdom,
and Professional Formation. Oxford University (B.A., 1974; (M.A., 1979)); University of
Michigan (LL.M., 1983). This Article is dedicated to the memory of our esteemed and much
beloved colleague, Dr. Harriet Anne Hathaway, a long-time Mercer University faculty
member and founding Dean of Mercer's Tift College of Education, who tragically left us in
December 2016 after a short illness. A leading voice in the Phronesis Project and its precursor Professionalism and Vocation Across the Professions Project, from the beginning
Anne understood and stressed the great importance of cultivating "dispositions" or virtues
in professional formation.
The Article grows out of my participation in the Notre Dame conference on "Virtue and
Its Development" described infra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. The original manuscript
was prepared as a draft chapter for the Developing the Virtues: InterdisciplinaryPerspectives book generated by the conference. Given the focus of the Notre Dame conference on
"pure" rather than "applied" virtue theory, however, in the end it did not seem appropriate
to include it in the book. I then reworked the manuscript as a law review article. The Article
does seem to fit well with the theme of this Mercer Law Review Symposium, and I am
grateful to Pat Longan and the Law Review for agreeing to include it with the other contributions in this Symposium volume. As I explain in more detail infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text, in addition to Nancy Snow's tripartite taxonomy of virtue acquisition,
which provides a central organizing structure for the Article, in various footnotes I address
and make connections with other aspects of virtue theory represented at the Notre Dame
conference and in the Developing the Virtues book. Moreover, given its centrality at the Law
Review Symposium, I have now also added more discussion of the Four Component Model
of Moral Development (FCM) in the Article, and in several footnotes I have included references to the other contributions in this Symposium volume. I would like to thank my good
friend and colleague Jack Sammons and two of the organizers of the Notre Dame conference
who are also co-editors of the Developing the Virtues book, Darcia Narvaez and Nancy Snow,
for reading the earlier draft chapter and for their very thoughtful and helpful suggestions.
I have endeavored to respond effectively to these suggestions but any remaining deficiencies are my sole responsibility.
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INTRODUCTION

It is a central axiom of this Article that the good lawyer is a virtuous
lawyer and that the possession and exercise of virtue is central to the
lawyer's professional character and professional identity. The Article is
therefore resonant with the school of "virtue jurisprudence" according to
which the behavior of legal actors such as judges and lawyers and the
ends of law pursued by legislators should be concerned with the development and exercise of virtues such as courage, honesty, integrity, wisdom,
temperance, and, of course, justice as central to a life of human flourishing.1 It is also resonant with the contentions of those scholars who have
written about the virtues of the good lawyer, whether or not these scholars would formally subscribe to or self-identify as adherents of the school
of virtue jurisprudence as such. 2 I seek to complement this corpus by exploring the question: But how do lawyers actually develop and exercise
1. For useful surveys of the tenets of the school of virtue jurisprudence, see Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law, in VIRTUE
JURISPRUDENCE 1-23 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: Towards An Aretaic Theory of Law, in ARISTOTLE AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND JUSTICE 1-31 (Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer & Nuno M.N.S. Coelho eds., 2013) [hereinafter Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence];Amalia
Amaya & Ho Hock Lai, Of Law, Virtue, and Jurisprudence,in LAW, VIRTUE, AND JUSTICE
1-25 (Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai eds., 2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Law and Virtue, in
THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO VIRTUE ETHICS 491-514 (Lorraine Besser-Jones & Michael Slote eds., 2015) [hereinafter Solum, Law and Virtue]. Solum summarizes the central
tenets as follows:
Virtue jurisprudenceis the name for a distinctive approach to normative legal
theory. One way to introduce the core of virtue jurisprudence is by adumbrating
its answers to three perennial questions about law. The first question is: "What
is the proper aim, goal, or telos of legislation?" Virtue jurisprudence answers that
the fundamental purpose of law is to promote the flourishing of individual humans and their communities by creating the conditions that promote and sustain the development and exercise of human excellence or virtue. The second
question is: "What is the standard for a lawful or legally correct resolution of a
dispute?" Virtue jurisprudence answers that the standard for lawfulness is best
understood as congruence with a decision that would be rendered by an adjudicator who possesses the judicial virtues or excellences: such a judge is both
phronimos (practically wise) and nominos (lawful). The third question is: "What
is the nature of lawfulness?" Virtue jurisprudence answers that the virtue of
lawfulness is best understood as the internalization of (and hence a disposition
to comply with) the nomoi-the deeply held and widely shared social norms that
function to enable flourishing in particular human communities.
Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence,supra, at 1.
2. For more jurisprudential and historical treatments, see, for example, ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993);
MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); Robert Araujo, The Virtuous
Lawyer: Paradigmand Possibility, 50 SMU L. REV. 433 (1997); Robert Araujo, The Lawyer's
Duty to Promote the Common Good: The Virtuous Law Student and Teacher, 40 S. TEX. L.
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virtue, including the "master virtue" of practical wisdom? This is a particularly timely question as law schools across the country work to implement new American Bar Association (ABA) law school accreditation
standards, requiring that they articulate explicit learning outcomes for
students' acquisition of knowledge, skills, and values and devise meaningful formative and summative assessment measures of these outcomes,
both for the institution as a whole and for individual courses. 3 However,
it is also a big question and I do not seek to answer it definitively in this
Article. Instead, I seek to stimulate conversation by offering a provisional
answer and by situating the question and my attempt to answer it within

REV. 83 (1999); Rosalind Hursthouse, Two Ways of Doing the Right Thing, in VIRTUE
JURISPRUDENCE 236 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008); ROBERT F.
BLOMQUIST, LAWYERLY VIRTUES (2008); Robert F. Blomquist, The PragmaticallyVirtuous
Lawyer, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 93 (2009); Michael McGinnis, Virtue Ethics, Earnestness,and
the Deciding Lawyer: Human Flourishingin a Legal Community, 87 N.D. L. REV. 19 (2011)
[hereinafter McGinnis, Virtue Ethics]; Michael McGinnis, Virtue and Advice: Socratic Perspectives on Lawyer Independence and Moral Counselingof Clients, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1
(2013). For more practical treatments, see, for example, ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF THE
PROFESSIONAL LAWYER (Paul Haskins ed., 2013); DOUGLAS 0. LINDER & NANCY LEVIT,
THE GOOD LAWYER: SEEKING QUALITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2014). For a very useful
review essay addressing the books by Kronman and Glendon, supra, and the virtues of
lawyers, judges, and law professors they identify, see Robert F. Cochran Jr., Lawyers and
Virtues: A Review Essay of Mary Ann Glendon's A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis
in the Legal Profession is TransformingAmerican Society and Anthony T. Kronman's The
Lost Lawyer: FailingIdeals of the Legal Profession, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 707 (1996).
For an illuminating comparative perspective from the United Kingdom, see JAMES ARTHUR,
KRISJAN KRISTANSSON, HYWEL THOMAS,
MICHAEL HOLDSWORTH,
LUCA BADINI
CONFALONIERI & TIAN QIU, VIRTUOUS CHARACTER FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW: RESEARCH

REPORT (The Jubilee Center for Character and Virtues, University of Birmingham 2014),
http://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/userfiles/jubilecentre/pdflResearch%20Reports/Virtuous
Character for thePractice- ofiLaw.pdf.
3. For the ABA's explanation of these requirements, see ABA SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, MANAGING DIRECTOR'S GUIDANCE MEMO:
STANDARDS 301, 302, 314, AND 315 (June 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ dam/
aba/administrative/legal-education andadmissionstothe_bar/governancedocments/20
15 learningoutcomes.guidance.authcheckdam.pdf. According to the Guidance Memo, the
following timeline applies: Academic Year (AY) 2016-17 (application of the relevant Standards begins); end of AY 2017-18 (learning outcomes in place); end of AY 2018-19 (adoption
and implementation of assessment plan). Id. at 6. Moreover, even after the learning outcomes and assessment measures are in place, the Standards direct law schools to engage
in a continuing process of review and necessary revision. Id. at 6-7. For discussion of the
particular ABA requirement that is especially relevant to the articulation of learning outcomes addressing the formation of an ethical professional identity, and for analysis of how
law schools have been responding to this requirement, see Neil Hamilton, Off-The-Shelf
Formative Assessments to Help Each Student Develop Toward a Professional Formation/EthicalProfessionalIdentity Learning Outcome of an Internalized Commitment to
the Student's Own ProfessionalDevelopment, 68 MERCER L. REV. 687, 689-91 (2017).

836

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

a broader framework that asks a bigger question: "How do professionals
develop and exercise virtue?" Moreover, this bigger question in turn is
part of an even bigger question: "How do humans develop and exercise
virtue?"4
This last question was the subject of a conference on "Virtue and Its
Development" held at the University of Notre Dame in May 2014.5 I was
privileged to be the only professional school educator presenting at this
interdisciplinary conference, participating on a panel entitled "Practical
Applications of Virtue Education."6 The conference brought together

4. I should perhaps explain that my own immediate strategy for cultivation of a "republic of virtue," as it were, is not focused on direct legislative efforts aimed at promoting
human flourishing by creating conditions for the development and exercise of virtue as advocated by Solum. See Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence,supranote 1, at 9-12; Solum, Law and
Virtue, supranote 1, at 508-13. Even as I would applaud and support such efforts, regrettably I am compelled to share Alasdair Maclntyre's deep skepticism about the potential for
the necessary virtuous activity by legislators in the current conditions of advanced free
market liberal democracies. See generally Alasdair Maclntyre, Politics, Philosophy, and the
Common Good, in THE MACINTYRE READER 235 (Kelvin Knight ed., 1998); see also
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 253 (3d ed. 2007)
(1981) (politics in modern liberal democracies is "civil war carried on by other means")
[hereinafter MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE]. Extending and adapting ideas MacIntyre has
explicated in various works. I place more faith in an indirect process in which virtue develops within professional poleis and spreads outward into the rest of society, thereby leading
to a gradual virtuous leavening of society. This leavening may then eventually also result
in legislation aimed at the promotion of virtue. For a preliminary sketch of such an approach, focused on the legal polis, see Mark L. Jones, FishermanJack: Living in "Juropolis"-The Fishing Village of the Law, 66 MERCER L. REV. 485, 510-12 (2015) [hereinafter
Jones, FishermanJack]. I identify three fundamental related commitments animating the
inhabitants of such professional poleis. These commitments, which demonstrate the inhabitants' concern for and dedication to the comon good and represent the virtue of civic mindedness, include: attaining, and helping their fellow inhabitants to attain, the goods of excellence of each practice in which they are engaged; subordinating goods of effectiveness to
goods of excellence; and acquiring various virtues. For further discussion, see id. at 500-12.
The reader will notice that these notions are reflected in this Article. For a detailed treatment, see Mark L. Jones, The Story of "Juropolis"-Trawling for Justice in the Fishing
Village of the Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). This "indirect" strategy
appears to be consistent with MacIntyre's most recent articulation of his own project as
"provid[ing] us with the resources for constructing a contemporary politics and ethics that
enables and requires us to act against modernity from within modernity." ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, ETHICS IN THE CONFLICTS OF MODERNITY: AN ESSAY ON DESIRE, PRACTICAL
REASONING, AND NARRATIVE xi (2016) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, CONFLICTS OF MODERNITY].
5. See Virtue and Its Development (originally titled Virtue and Its Development: An
Interdisciplinary Symposium), May 19-22, 2014, http://www3.nd.edul-dnarvaezVirtue
DevelopmentSymposium.htm.
6. The two other panelists were Paul Lewis, a Mercer colleague in the Christianity
Department at the Mercer College of Liberal Arts, and Jay Brandenberger, Associate Director for Research and Assessment at the Center for Social Concerns of the University of
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moral philosophers and cognitive and developmental psychologists to explore a wide range of questions and concerns in the area of virtue theory.
These include such matters as: the development of pre-moral capacities
or sensibilities that provide the foundations for moral behavior, virtue,
and moral identity; the nature of moral identity or the moral self; the
notion of a continuum of moral development; the processes for acquiring
virtue within this continuum; and the impact of situational factors in
promoting or impeding the development and exercise of virtue. The matters of virtue theory addressed by the conference, and by the Oxford Uni-

versity Press book Developing the Virtues: IntegratingPerspectives that
the conference has generated, 7 should be of great interest to legal educators and other professional educators. A more complete list of matters
addressed at the conference and in the book is given in the Appendix to
this Article.
Although the development of virtue is a lifelong process on a continuum extending from early childhood through the end of life, this Article
is concerned centrally with the processes by which students preparing to
enter the legal profession and other professions acquire virtue (including
practical wisdom). My focus, then, is on educating for virtue in professional practice and on the work of legal educators and other professional
educators in forming the professional character and identity of their students (professional formation). In this Article, I use the term "professional educators" to mean educators in the various professions. The professions include those occupations addressed by the Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Teaching in its Preparation for the Professions
Project-the traditional "learned professions" such as medicine, 8 law,9

Notre Dame. Together with Daisy Floyd and Tanya Sharon, Paul Lewis and I serve as codirectors of the Mercer University Phronesis Project for the Exploration of Character, Practical Wisdom, and Professional Formation. For a description of the history and nature of
the Phronesis Project, see Mark Jones, AppendixA: BuildingBridges and DiscoveringCommonality: The Story of Mercer University's Professionalismand Vocation Across the Professions Project, in TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING: CHARACTER, PRACTICAL WISDOM, AND
PROFESSIONAL FORMATION 217-26 (Mark L. Jones, Paul A. Lewis & Kelly E. Reffitt eds.,
2013) [hereinafter TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING]; Paul A. Lewis, Appendix B: Moral Development Across Disciplines, Schools, and Life Span: The PhronesisProject, in TOWARD
HUMAN FLOURISHING, at 227-32.
7.

DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES: INTEGRATING PERSPECTIVES (Julia Annas, Darcia

Narvaez & Nancy E. Snow eds., 2016) [hereinafter DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES].
8. MOLLY COOKE, DAVID M. IRBY & BRIDGET C. O'BRIEN, EDUCATING PHYSICIANS:
A CALL FOR REFORM OF MEDICAL SCHOOL AND RESIDENCY (2010).
&

9. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD BOND
LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW

(2007).
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and the ministry,10 and more modern professions such as nursing" and
engineering.12 Much of what I say will also be relevant to professions understood more broadly and thus implicate the work of educators in additional fields such as accountancy, physics, or psychology. This is consistent with Carnegie's call, resulting from its Life of the Mind for
Practice Seminar, to reimagine undergraduate liberal arts education as
being about the development not only of subject matter knowledge and
skills of critical thinking but also of additional qualities that are needed
for the exercise of practical reason in a life of practice.13 Much of what I
say will be relevant as well to other kinds of occupational practices,
whether or not they require a higher education qualification and whether
or not they would be called professions-for example, plumbing, construction, or fishing.
This Article is largely organized around philosopher Nancy Snow's tripartite taxonomy of paradigms for virtue acquisition through habituation-non-conscious development of virtuous habits through "goal-dependent automaticity," conscious development of virtuous habits
modeled on acquisition of practical skill or expertise, and conscious development of virtuous habits through the Confucian way of the junziwhich I apply to professional education, in particular legal education. 14 I
am also guided by Snow's understanding of virtues:
[VIirtues are character states or dispositions that are entrenched in
the sense of being deep-seated parts of someone's personality, and are
temporally enduring. Virtues reliably give rise to virtuous actions,
that is, actions that are motivated by the desire to act virtuously in the
circumstances, and are guided by practical rationality. Virtues in this
sense are formed . .. through habituation. . . . Ideally, specific virtues,
such as courage, generosity, and compassion, become well-integrated
components of personality, forming what we would call "character."

Practical rationality, as well as appropriate motivation, is essential for

10. CHARLES R. FOSTER, LISA E. DAHILL, LAWRENCE A. GOLEMON & BARBARA
WANG TOLENTINO, EDUCATING CLERGY: TEACHING PRACTICES AND PASTORAL
IMAGINATION (2006).
11. PATRICIA BENNER, MOLLY SUTPHEN, VICTORIA LEONARD
EDUCATING NURSES: A CALL FOR RADICAL TRANSFORMATION (2010).

&

LISA

DAY,

12. SHERI SHEPPARD, KELLY MACATANGAY, ANNE COLBY & WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN,
EDUCATING ENGINEERS: DESIGNING FOR THE FUTURE OF THE FIELD (2009).

&

13. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN & MATTHEW S. RoSIN, A NEW AGENDA FOR HIGHER
EDUCATION: SHAPING A LIFE OF THE MIND FOR PRACTICE (2008); see also Anne Colby

William M. Sullivan, Strengthening the Foundationsof Students'Excellence, Integrity, and
Social Contribution, 95 LIBERAL EDUC. 22 (Winter 2009).
14. See Nancy E. Snow, How Habits Make Us Virtuous, in DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES,
supra note 7, at 135-56.
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virtuous action, yet at some point, virtues should become "second nature," in the sense that possessors of virtue should become able to act
virtuously without the need for conscious deliberation about whether
15
and how to act.
I realize that Nancy Snow did not have professional education in mind
when developing her tripartite taxonomy. However, I trust that in extending and adapting her taxonomy to the particular context of professional education I am not perverting her original design but rather complementing, indeed complimenting, it by demonstrating its generative
potential.
The account in this Article is intended to be suggestive and illustrative, not exhaustive and comprehensive. The goal is to begin the process
of inquiry and to suggest "how the conversation might go" in the future
with regard to descriptive inquiry into what legal educators and other
professional educators are already doing to develop virtue in their students and normative inquiry into how this might be improved upon. With
this goal in mind, in addition to Nancy Snow's tripartite taxonomy, I will
address and make connections with other aspects of virtue theory represented at the Notre Dame conference and in the Developing the Virtues
book, to which therefore this Article can also be seen as a companion and
vice-versa. Mostly this will be done in footnotes to specific points in the
discussion. More generally, however, the reader should understand that
everything I write assumes the importance of the types of questions and
concerns addressed by Stuart, Narvaez, Emde, Thompson, and Miller for
understanding our moral world and the basic "moral material" that legal
educators and other professional educators have to take into account in
our work-our students, those they will serve as professionals, and of
course ourselves.' 6 For example, it seems critical to try to understand
how a student's ethical orientation may conduce to or impede efforts to

15. Id. at 135.
16. See Susan Stuart, Enkinasethesiaand the Deep Roots of Morality (presented at the
conference but not included in the book), https://www3.nd.edul-dnarvaez/documents/Stuar
tEnkinaesthesiaandtheDeepRootsofMoralilty.pdf; Darcia Narvaez, Baselines for Virtue, in
DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES, supra note 7, at 14-33; Robert M. Emde, From a Baby Smiling:
Reflections on Virtues in Development, in DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES, supranote 7, at 6994; Ross A. Thompson & Abby S. Lavine, The Development of Virtuous Character:Automatic
and Reflective Dispositions, in DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES, supranote 7, at 95-115; Christian Miller, Virtue Cultivation in Light of Situationism, in DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES, supranote 7, at 157-83.
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cultivate that student's virtue and optimal moral functioning.1 7 Similarly, it seems vital to investigate whether the impact of situational factors generated by various aspects of a law school's or other professional
school's so-called "moral climate" reinforces or impedes such efforts. 18
Given the centrality of the Four Component Model of Moral Development (FCM) to the explorations in this Symposium, something should be
said about its relationship to the development and exercise of virtue. The
FCM provides the "moral infrastructure" or "moral technology" necessary
to effect any approach to morality and ethics, including an approach that
stresses a moral actor's virtue and character. Thus, the virtuous actor
recognizes the occasions for virtue, judges well what virtue requires in
the particular situation, is motivated to act virtuously, and acts accordingly. Consequently, the foundational moral skills or capacities of moral
sensitivity, moral reasoning, moral motivation, and moral implementation must develop in tandem with the development of virtues. This becomes explicit in the discussion of Pat Longan's course on The Legal Profession in Part III and should be understood as implicit elsewhere. In this
way, then, the FCM is also a vital part of virtue theory that complements
the other aspects of virtue theory addressed at the Notre Dame conference and in the Developing the Virtues book. Moreover, many of these
other aspects, including Nancy Snow's tripartite taxonomy of virtue acquisition, would also seem to be relevant analogously to the development
and exercise of the moral skills or capacities in the FCM itself. 19
Part I addresses the development, or perhaps more accurately the further development, and exercise of those virtues that are fundamental
prerequisites for successfully entering and sustaining any professional
practice, including legal practice; Part II explores the nature of professional practical wisdom, including lawyerly practical wisdom, providing

17. See Narvaez, Baselinesfor Virtue, supranote 16 (discussing three main ethical orientations-Safety or Self-protectionist orientation (combative or compliant), Engagement
orientation, and Imagination orientation).
18. See Miller, supra note 16 (discussing situationism and the influence of unconscious
mental dispositions). Apart from references to Nancy Snow's contribution throughout the
article, the footnotes addressing, and making connections with, the other contributions at
specific points in the discussion include notes 19, 20, 29, 32, 39, 42, 45, 48, 49, 59, 64, 66,
84, 112, 113, 114, 121.
19. At least two of the contributions in the Developing the Virtues book come very close
to addressing the FCM explicitly in their treatment of various FCM components. See Daniel
K. Lapsley, Moral Self-Identity and the Social-Cognitive Theory of Virtue, in DEVELOPING
THE VIRTUES, supra note 7, at 34-68; Matt Stichter, The Role of Motivation and Wisdom
in Virtues as Skills, in DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES, supra note 7, at 204-23. Daniel Lapsley
participated in the Notre Dame conference; Matt Stichter provided a post-conference contribution to the book.
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a schematic account of its central features or elements and how they relate to more particular attributes, including virtues; and Part III identifies and describes various pedagogical approaches and specific pedagogies that serve to develop particular lawyerly virtues, more general
intellectual and moral virtues, and lawyerly practical wisdom in law students, also drawing comparisons with professional education in other
fields.

I. PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES
A. The Nature of a Professional Practiceand Its Goods
Following the analysis of philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre in his seminal book After Virtue, the good practitioner 20 in any "practice," including
a professional practice such as the practice of law, attains "internal
goods" of the practice through skillful activity aimed at achieving the
ends or goals of the practice and performed in accordance with its various
rules and standards of excellence. The practice is borne and sustained by
institutions (for example, a law firm or the ABA), and is "transmitted and
shaped" from one generation of practitioners to another through a con21
tinuously evolving living tradition.
Although further detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this particular Article, 22 two points require elaboration for present purposes.
First, the good practitioner attains at least three main types of internal
goods or "goods of excellence" of the practice: 23 the excellence of the practitioner's performance, the excellence of the product resulting from this

20. When I use the term "good practitioner" in this Article, the word "good" is a virtue
term that functions as what Julia Annas calls a "thick concept" that "evaluate[s] the kind
of thing that is said to be good, according to the criteria for goodness of that kind of thing"
in contrast to a deontic term such as "right" or "wrong" that functions as a "thin concept"
with very little content. Julia Annas, Learning Virtue Rules: The Issue of Thick Concepts,
in DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES, supranote 7, at 224-34.
21. For MacIntyre's detailed discussion of the various notions discussed in this paragraph, see MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 4, at 187-91, 193-94, 221-22; ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL INQUIRY: ENCYCLOPAEDIA,
GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 62-64 (1990); MACINTYRE, CONFLICTS OF MODERNITY, supra note 4, at 49-51.
22. For such discussion, see Jones, FishermanJack, supranote 4, at 487-94.
23. For MacIntyre's use of the term "goods of excellence," see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE, WHOSE RATIONALITY? 31-32 (1988) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, WHOSE
JUSTICE?].
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performance, and the excellence of the way of life that is lived out as a
practitioner in the practice. 24
Second, internal goods are to be contrasted with "external goods" or
"goods of effectiveness," 25 such as money, power, fame, or prestige. 26 Although a practitioner in a professional practice requires an adequate
amount of goods of effectiveness to flourish in the practice, the flourishing
itself consists predominantly in achieving the goods of excellence of the
practice. 27 This emphasis on human flourishing through the achievement
of excellence is consistent with MacIntyre's neo-Aristotelian position in
After Virtue as well as his later position embracing Thomistic Aristotelianism in Dependent Rational Animals and, most recently, in Ethics in
the Conflicts of Modernity.28
B. FundamentalPrerequisiteVirtues
We will see in Part II and Part III how success in a professional practice and attainment of its goods of excellence consists centrally in the
practice of virtue. Here we must consider those fundamental prerequisite
virtues without which it is not possible to attain and sustain the goods of
excellence in the first place. And here again we will largely follow the
analysis of Alasdair MacIntyre. To begin with, those entering a professional practice can only attain its internal goods or goods of excellence by
submitting to the authority of existing practitioners and the achievements of past practitioners to teach them what they need to know. 29 But
to be able to submit to the authority of the practice and its tradition aspiring practitioners (law students, for example) require virtues such as
justice, courage, and honesty. Thus, they must give due deference to the

24. This is inferred from MacIntyre's discussion of the "internal goods" of the practice
of portrait painting as it developed in Western Europe between the late middle ages and
the eighteenth century. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 4, at 189-90.
25. For MacIntyre's use of the term "goods of effectiveness," see MACINTYRE, WHOSE
JUSTICE?, supra note 23, at 31-32.
26. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 4, at 188, 194.
27. For other differences between these types of goods, see Jones, FishermanJack, supra note 4, at 490-91.
28. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY
HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES (1999) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, RATIONAL
ANIMALS]; MACINTYRE, CONFLICTS OF MODERNITY, supranote 4.
29. In this way those entering the practice learn to acquire what Julia Annas calls the
"evaluative point of view" (which we might also call the "the internal point of view") of those
already expert in the practice and in the exercise of its virtues, in contrast to the "external
point of view . . . in which the observer is ignorant of, or does not share, the agent's evaluations." Annas, supra note 20, at 229.
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wisdom of present and past practitioners, courageously expose their inadequacies when learning how to engage in the practice, and honestly
accept criticism of those inadequacies and suggestions for improvement. 30
Moreover, members of the legal profession and other professions can
only attain and then sustain the goods of excellence of the practice and
the tradition of the practice if they are able to defend them against corrupting forces that threaten to subordinate them to external goods or
goods of effectiveness. These forces include not only the individual temptation to cheat in order more readily to attain these latter goods, but also
the collective temptation to cheat in pursuit of such goods by the institution that carries the practice. 31 And resisting these forces again requires
the virtues of justice, courage, and truthfulness.32 Sometimes, moreover,
this resistance involves an appeal to the history of the tradition of the
practice to challenge current trends because as MacIntyre observes,
there may be "sequences of decline as well as of progress" in the evolution
of a practice. 33
In his later work, MacIntyre has expanded and refined these ideas.
Thus, MacIntyre has stressed that attaining the goods of excellence essential to human flourishing depends upon developing powers as an "independent practical reasoner. "34 In other words, a person must seek to
acquire what we call here the "master virtue" of practical wisdom and
35
exercise it in all the practices in which that person participates. These
powers are developed within networks of "relationships of giving and receiving" within practices including relationships between teachers and
36
students and between expert practitioners and apprentices. And we can
only learn how to become independent practical reasoners within these

30.

MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 4, at 191, 194.

31. For elucidation of the concept of cheating in the context of professional practice, see
Jack L. Sammons, 'Cheater!'TheCentralMoral Admonition of Legal Ethics, Games, Lusory
Attitudes, InternalPerspectives, and Justice, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 273 (2003).
32. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 4, at 194, 223. Along similar lines, Christine Swanton suggests that "[t]he field of the virtue [of self-improvement] is aspirational:
strivings to improve oneself, and also to maintain those improvements against corrupting
influences." Christine Swanton, Developmental Virtue Ethics, in DEVELOPING THE
VIRTUES, supranote 7, at 129.
33. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 4, at 189.
34. MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 28, at 65-66, 71, 105.
35. See id. at 76-77, 92 (emphasizing excellence as an independent practical reasoner
and the virtues of independent practical reasoning); MACINTYRE, CONFLICTS OF
MODERNITY, supra note 4, at 49-50, 74, 118, 180-81, 215-18 (emphasizing the importance
of prudence, or practical wisdom, for success in practices and human flourishing).
36. MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supranote 28, at 89, 91-92, 99, 106-08.
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networks by developing and exercising virtues such as justice, courage,
truthfulness, and temperateness.3 7 Moreover, sustaining these networks
and relationships of giving and receiving also requires the "virtues of
acknowledged dependence" including the composite virtue of "just generosity" on the part of teachers and expert practitioners as givers, virtues
such as appropriate gratitude on the part of students and apprentices as
receivers, and "truthfulness in accountability" on the part of both givers
and receivers.3 8
We should also not overlook the important role of dialogic virtues in
the process of attaining and sustaining the goods of excellence of a professional practice, 39 and more broadly in sustaining the ongoing conversation that is constitutive of the practice. 40 Moreover, following Jack
Sammons' lovely reframing of practices as art, we might perhaps identify
as the most fundamental virtue, undergirding and infusing all the others,
a particular form of humility, that is, a humility before and a resulting
attunement to the materials of the practice, or art.4 1
In these ways, then, members of the professions develop, or more accurately perhaps, further develop the virtues of justice, courage, truthfulness, temperateness, just generosity, gratitude, humility, and the dialogic virtues by exercising a particular form of these virtues in the course
of seeking to attain (as students and apprentices), and then to sustain (as
practitioners), the goods of excellence of a professional practice. 42 This
37. Id. at 87-98, 120.
38. Id. at 99-101, 108, 119-28, 149-52.
39. There is a clear resonance here with Christine Swanton's point that even "an agent
with mature virtue requires the dialogic virtues to make up for the shortfall in her
knowledge and her perspectival limitations. She also needs these to participate in collective
decision-making." Swanton, supra note 32, at 129.
40. I am indebted to Jack Sammons for bringing this latter point to my attention. Nor
should we overlook the fundamental importance of virtues of performance character (in
addition to virtues of moral character) for attaining and sustaining the goods of excellence.
For further discussion of the virtues of performance character, see infra notes 60, 87-88 and
accompanying text.
41. See Jack L. Sammons, Can Law Be Art?, 66 MERCER L. REV. 527 (2015) (setting
forth this approach). In email correspondence with me, Jack also proposes "a missing virtue,
one related to others but perhaps separate: the virtue of coming to accept the mostly imagined community of practitioners as a 'we' partly definitional of who you are and are to become. It is a virtue at odds with the liberal presumptions in our time." E-mail from Jack
Sammons, Professor Emeritus, Mercer University School of Law, to author (May 13, 2015)
(on file with author).
42. Such forms of these virtues would seem to implicate the process by which narrower
dispositions or virtues can be generalized into broader or more general virtues. For discussion of this process, see Swanton, supra note 32, at 123-28 (explaining how "basic virtue"
(virtues such as generosity, patience, or courage "described at a high level of generality")
can be differentiated according to stage of life (for example, childhood), role occupation (for

2017] DEVELOPING VIRTUE & PRACTICAL WISDOM

845

process would seem to be an instance of Nancy Snow's first paradigm of
virtue acquisition, that is, the non-conscious development of virtuous
habits through "goal-dependent automaticity" or "folk" habituation. As
Snow explains, people can develop virtue through automatic or non-conscious processing while consciously aiming at something else.4 3 Thus, "in
aspiring to a goal ... they perform actions that, arguably, express virtue,
and do so repeatedly. In this way-through the repeated performance of
virtuous actions . .. needed for the attainment of desired goals-they can
develop virtuous dispositions, though much of this happens outside of
conscious awareness."44 Although Snow does not use the term herself,
one can say that virtue supervenes upon those actions that are done with
another goal in mind. No doubt the virtuous actions discussed in this section draw on virtuous dispositions that have already been forming
through earlier experience. But there is also no doubt that these virtuous
dispositions are also repeatedly strengthened and reinforced through
these actions. 45
II. PRACTICAL WISDOM IN THE PROFESSIONS

A. Qualities of Excellence-Knowledge, Skills, and Virtues; The "Master
Virtue" of PracticalWisdom
Recall that a good practitioner in a professional practice attains at
least three main types of internal goods or goods of excellence: the excellence of the practitioner's performance, the excellence of the product resulting from this performance, and the excellence of the way of life that
is lived out as a practitioner in the practice. 46 To attain these goods of
excellence the practitioner must possess various qualities or attributes
which we can therefore call "qualities of excellence," which themselves
7
are recursively among the goods of excellence.4 Specifically, the practitioner needs various kinds of theoretical knowledge, skills, and qualities
example, as CEO), etc., and how such "differentiated virtue" can then develop into "mature
virtue," that is, "virtue differentiated by maturity"). But see Miller, supra note 16, at 163-

64; Rachana Kamtekar, Becoming Good: Narrow Dispositionsand the Stability of Virtue,
in DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES, supra note 7, at 190-99 (expressing skepticism that narrower or "local" dispositions or virtues can develop into "global" virtues).
43. Snow, supranote 14, at 136, 137-42.
44. Id. at 138-39.
45. At least there is no doubt if Christine Swanton's account of the development of
"differentiated virtue" into "mature virtue" is correct. See Swanton, supranote 42.
46. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
47. Because excellence of the practitioner's performance and way of life are internal
goods or goods of excellence of the practice, the qualities of excellence that are central to
such performance and way of life are also goods of excellence themselves.
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of character (dispositions, attitudes, or virtues), with the overarching
"master virtue" of prudence or practical wisdom (phronesis)-MacIntyre's excellence in independent practical reasoning-at their apex.
The "master virtue" of practical wisdom is at the apex because acting well
in a situation may require more than the exercise of the particular qualities of excellence alone. This point can be clearly illustrated by considering the exercise of general virtues such as honesty, kindness, or generosity. Thus, practical wisdom is needed when such virtues conflict, actually
or potentially, or when different values or considerations in exercising
just one virtue do so: Should I be honest or should I be kind?4 8 Alternatively, is there a kinder or more sensitive way to be honest? What should
I do if there are several possible objects of my generosity but only finite
resources (of time or treasure)? And so on.
I propose the following features or elements as central to the distinctive practical wisdom of a given professional field:
* Professional practical wisdom is an attribute of the expert in a professional practice (the professional as phronimos; for example, the lawyer-phronimos).
* Specifically, it is the ability of the professional phronimos to access,
draw on, and conduct other, particular qualities or attributes in a way
appropriate to the context,
* And thus:
o To see the world and read professional situations in a
distinctive way,49
o To reason well about ends and means,
o To be motivated to translate thinking into action, and
o To act:

. So as to do the right thing in the right way at the
right time for the right reason in the particular circumstances,
. For the benefit of the individual, organization, or

48. Matt Stichter discusses this particular example to illustrate the role of practical
wisdom in "unifying the [discrete] virtues." Stichter, supranote 19, at 215-17.
49. On the question of how, cognitively and affectively, the virtuous and practically
wise agent "sees the world" and "reads" situations in a particular way generating distinctive
reasons for action, see Swanton, supra note 32, at 128-29; Mark LeBar, Norms of Justice in
Development, in DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES, supra note 7, at 284. In addition to this first
person "agential perspective[|," LeBar's account also recognizes a third person agential perspective requiring that "what we take to be reasons must be intelligible to others as reasons." LeBar, supra, at 285. In the account given here, this requirement is satisfied by the
final element in the present set "just as a professional phronimos would," as judged by the
professional community.
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community being served,
. Just as a professional phronimos would.
* In short, the professional phronimos
o Has good judgment, and
o Acts on that good judgment.
* The power of the professional phronimos to act well in context is
most strikingly displayed under conditions of inherent uncertainty;
* Depending on such factors as complexity, ambiguity, and novelty the
reasoning about ends or means involved in exercising professional practical wisdom may be
" Intuitive and instantaneous, or
o Conscious and deliberate, and
o In the latter case, when deliberating the professional
phronimos will "[a]t a minimum . .. gather all available
information,... seek and value input from others, and
...

weigh all possible options."

50

* The particular qualities or attributes the professional phronimos accesses, draws upon, and conducts
o Are deeply ingrained and seamlessly integrated,
o May incorporate, build upon, and extend or modify
qualities or attributes that the practitioner has already
acquired and developed before entering the practice,5 1
o Include doctrinal knowledge, analytical and practical
skills, and qualities of performance character (dispositions,
attitudes, or virtues),
o Include also moral knowledge and skills, and qualities
of moral character (dispositions, attitudes, or virtues),
o Among which is the ability to balance the qualities of
empathy and detachment, which lies at the heart or core
of professional practical wisdom.

.

50. Linda H. Edwards, Advocacy as an Exercise in Virtue: Lawyering, Bad Facts, and
Furman's High-Stakes Dilemma, 66 MERCER L. REV. 425, 431-32 (2015) (citing MITCH
FINLEY, THE CATHOLIC VIRTUES: SEVEN PILLARS OF A GOOD LIFE 51-52, 58-59 (1999)
Often of course, the good professional practitioner will employ both intuitive and deliberative reasoning. For a good sense of the complexities involved in the practice of lawyering,
including the risks of inappropriate reliance on intuition, see LINDER & LEVIT, supra note
2, at 128-57. For a thorough in-depth treatment, see PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON
KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A

GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS (2010).
51. For further discussion of this point, see Mark L. Jones, PracticalWisdom and Vocation in ProfessionalFormation:A Schematic Account, in TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING,
supra note 6, at 195-96 [hereinafter Jones, Schematic Account].
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* Study alone may be sufficient to acquire much of the needed theoretical doctrinal and moral knowledge, but
* Habitual practice and experience are necessary
o To develop the required skills, and
o To develop the required qualities of character;
* Habitual practice and experience are also necessary to develop the
master virtue of professional practical wisdom itself.
* Typically professional practical wisdom supervenes upon the process
of professional education as a whole as the particular qualities or attributes upon which it draws are developed, exercised, and integrated in various simulated and actual contexts of practice.
The preceding schematic account is presented at a high level of abstraction. 52 It is intended to be sufficiently general, flexible, and capacious to accommodate and integrate more detailed accounts of (a) the
steps and abilities involved in accessing, drawing upon, and conducting
appropriately the other relevant qualities or attributes, as well as (b)
these other relevant qualities or attributes. These accounts include MacIntyre's three foundational abilities necessary to develop "the capacities
of independent practical reasoners"; 53 Aaronson's six "key characteristics
54
and dynamics . . . of practical judgment"; Ritchie's five "distinct steps"
of "inquiry" in the practical reasoning of the competent and practically
wise practitioner;5 5 Sammons' five "central components" of practically
wise deliberation; 5 6 Schwartz and Sharpe's six "moral abilities" of the
practically wise person; 57 and Narvaez's and Lewis's elements of "moral
expertise."55
52. Although focused on professional practical wisdom it applies mutatis mutandis in
other contexts as well, including the personal and the political.
53. MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 28, at 83; see also id. at 71-76, 9192, 147-48.
54. Mark Neal Aaronson, Thinking Like a Fox: Four Overlapping Domains of Good
Lawyering, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 34-37 (2002).
55. David Ritchie, Being PragmaticAbout Practical Wisdom, in TOWARD HUMAN
FLOURISHING, supra note 6, at 199-206.
56. Jack Sammons, Guidelines for Observing Practical Wisdom at Work, in TOWARD
HUMAN FLOURISHING, supra note 6, at 207-12.
57. Barry Schwartz & Kenneth Sharpe, The War on Wisdom and How to Fight It, in
TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING, supra note 6, at 175-77 [hereinafter Schwartz & Sharpe,
War on Wisdom].
58. Darcia Narvaez, Wisdom as Mature Moral Functioning:Insights from Developmental Psychology and Neurobiology, in TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING, supra note 6, at 3537; Paul A. Lewis, Contemporary CharacterEducation in Context, in TOWARD HUMAN
FLOURISHING, supra note 6, at 20-22. These elements are essentially the elements of the
FCM.
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Although I do not attempt to articulate a full account of professional
practical wisdom in this Article, two points should be emphasized here.
First, as reflected in the above schematic presentation, at the heart or
core of professional practical wisdom, especially when understood to include moral expertise, is the ability to balance empathy and detachment.5 9 Second, technical expertise draws on doctrinal knowledge and
skills as well as certain qualities of character, especially qualities of what
Thomas Lickona calls performance character (with virtues or "character
attributes such as creativity, curiosity, love of learning and persistence").6 0 As William May intimates, many today seem to equate such
technical expertise with practical wisdom. 61 Moral expertise draws on
moral knowledge and skills as well as qualities both of performance character and of what Lickona (and others) call moral character (with virtues
such as courage, love, justice, tolerance, generosity, temperance, honesty,
empathy, and caring for others). 62 And again, Narvaez and Schwartz and
Sharpe seem to equate such moral expertise with practical wisdom. 63 I
take a broader view and consider that practical wisdom requires both
technical expertise and moral expertise.6 4 In the professions, the first understanding of practical wisdom is associated with the professional ideal
of "technical professionalism," and the second and third understandings
are associated with the professional ideal of "civic professionalism." 65

59. BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY
TO DO THE RIGHT THING 39-41 (2010) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, PRACTICAL

WISDOM]; Schwartz & Sharpe, War on Wisdom, supra note 57, at 176-77. For a sophisticated discussion of different forms of empathy and the role of guilt and shame in developing
proper empathy and genuine moral motivation, see Jennifer H. Herdt, Guilt and Shame in
the Development of Virtue, in DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES, supra note 7, at 235-54.
60. Thomas Lickona, Developing the Ethical Thinker and Responsible Moral Agent, in
TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING, supra note 6, at 43-46.
61. WILLIAM F. MAY, BELEAGUERED RULERS: THE PUBLIC OBLIGATION OF THE

PROFESSIONAL 80, 172 (2001).
62. Lickona, supra note 60, at 43-46, 52-53, 60-63.
63. Narvaez, supra note 58, at 24-40; Schwartz & Sharpe, War on Wisdom, supra note
57, at 175-77.
64. Mark L. Jones, FundamentalDimensionsofLaw and Legal Education:Perspectives
on CurriculumReform, MercerLaw School's Woodruff Curriculum, and . . . "Perspectives,"
63 MERCER L. REV. 975, 992-1002 (2012) [hereinafter Jones, Perspectives]; Jones, Schematic Account, supra note 51, at 193-96; Jones, FishermanJack, supra note 4, at 487, 50006. In his post-conference contribution to the Developing the Virtues book, Matt Stichter
articulates a similar approach, although he seems to reserve the term "expertise" for technical expertise. See Stichter, supranote 19.
65. For discussion of these concepts, see generally WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND
INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA (2005).
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B. From Novice Apprentice to Expert Practitioner:The Process of
ProfessionalFormationand the Role of ProfessionalEducation
It is not the case that a person first develops particular qualities of
excellence and only then develops the overarching practical wisdom of
the professional practice as the culminating master virtue. Instead, even
though some particular qualities of excellence may develop sooner than
others, in general one develops all these qualities of excellence, including
professional practical wisdom, gradually while moving along a continuum from novice apprentice to the expert practitioner who possesses
them in full measure.66 In this process of growth the aspiring expert practitioner moves towards becoming a phronimos in the practice, and thus
towards becoming a particular kind of person and developing a particular
67
kind of professional character and professional identity. This is the process of professional formation and it is the particular concern of professional education. Here we return to Nancy Snow's paradigms of virtue
acquisition.68 There is an important role for all three paradigms in professional education, and it is helpful to think of them in this context as
general pedagogical approaches (as opposed to specific pedagogies, which
are also discussed in what follows).
III. THE EXAMPLE OF LEGAL EDUCATION
We will explore and illustrate these matters by focusing on legal education. At the risk of some over-generalization, the broad trajectory of
formal legal education during the history of the Republic has been to
move out of the practical setting of apprenticeship in the office of a practicing lawyer who acted as mentor and into the academic setting of the
69
university staffed by full time faculty. With some exceptions and de-

spite increasing pressures for radical structural reform, most enter the

66. This understanding of gradual progress along a continuum is resonant with the
nuanced account of continuous virtue development, reflecting the more general notion that
life itself is a continuing process of development, given by Christine Swanton. See Swanton,
supra note 42.
67. Another way to view this process is that it involves the creation of a particular kind
of moral self or moral identity. For further discussion of these concepts and the "chronically
accessible" cognitive schemas that underpin moral identity, see Lapsley, supra note 19, at
38-49. And for a lovely account of the "art" of forming a professional self, see Jack L. Sammons, The Art of Self and Becoming a Professional, 68 MERCER L. REV. 741 (2017) ("Who
you are and are to become, and the meaning you seek in this . . . will disclose itself to you
through the materials and experiences of your life as a professional when you approach
these with the attitude of an artist." Id. at 762).
68. Snow, supra note 14.
69. For details regarding this trajectory, see generally ROBERT B. STEVENS, LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s (1983).
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legal profession today after completing three years of postgraduate legal
training at an ABA-accredited law school and passing a state bar exam. 70
A. The Goals of Legal Education-Becominga Lawyer-Phronimos
The primary goal of a legal education is to prepare students for legal
practice, although many would accept as a secondary goal preparing students for positions of political and social leadership to the extent such
roles require qualities not already required for good lawyering. 71 Following my account of qualities of excellence in Part II Section A above, upon
graduation the student has acquired, or is well on the way to acquiring,
the practical wisdom of the profession. According to William May, wise
lawyers must possess the virtues of fidelity to the client, public spiritedness, and independence or integrity (which in turn requires the virtues
of temperance and courage). But above all, they must possess the virtue
of practical wisdom. 72 Observing that "attorneys constantly make judgment calls," Mark Aaronson explains that good judgment requires "the
contextual synthesizing and prioritizing of a range of factors, including
facts, feelings, values, and general and expert knowledge, all at once."73
And Roy Stuckey and others refer to "the integrative application of
knowledge, skills, and values" necessary for competent lawyering. 74 This
good judgment is needed in the courtroom as well as the office.75 In sum,
the lawyer-phronimos has learned to "think like a lawyer" in the broad
sense. More than a skill, the "master virtue" of lawyerly practical wisdom
"requires nothing less than a transformation of the person, an acquisition
of a manner, bearing, and style of thought for life."7 6

70. The detailed requirements for admission to practice in each state are published
jointly by the National Conference of Bar Examiners and the American Bar Association.
See generally Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admissions Requirements 2017, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM'R & ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR,

http://www.ncbex.org/publications/bar-admissions-guide/ (last visited May 1, 2017).
71. For further discussion of this secondary goal, see Jones, Perspectives, supra note
64, at 978, 1051-53; Ben W. Heineman, Jr., William F. Lee & David B. Wilkins, Lawyers as
Professionalsand as Citizens: Key Roles and Responsibilities in the 21" Century, HARVARD
LAW SCH. CTR. ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2014), https://clp.law.harvard.edu/assets/Professionalism-Project-Essay 11.20.14.pdf.
72. MAY, supra note 61, at 78-84.
73. Aaronson, supranote 54, at 32.
74.

RoY

STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 60 (2007).

75. See Daisy H. Floyd, Practical Wisdom: Reimagining Legal Education, 10 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 195, 196-99 (2013) (giving several illustrations).
76. Jack L. Sammons, Traditionalists,Technicians, and Legal Education, 38 GONZ. L.
REV. 237, 238 (2002-03).
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As in most professional education, the development of lawyerly practical wisdom typically supervenes upon the process of legal education as
a whole, and this is another instance of Nancy Snow's first paradigm of
virtue acquisition, the development of virtuous habits through "goal-dependent automaticity" or "folk" habituation. 77 However, my colleague
Daisy Floyd has proposed practical wisdom as an explicit framework for
reimagining American legal education 78-as has already occurred to
some extent at Mercer University School of Law-and this would shift
the development of lawyerly practical wisdom from Snow's first paradigm
to the second, the conscious acquisition of expertise.7 9 As the conversation
about this proposal proceeds, moreover, we will all gain a better understanding of what, more precisely, the lawyer's practical wisdom actually
is.80

B. The Methods of Legal Education-Curriculumand Pedagogy
Let us now examine the law school curriculum and some of its central
pedagogies more closely.81 At Mercer, for example, students will take several required and elective courses that impart doctrinal knowledge of various areas of substantive law, and that also develop the analytical skill
of legal reasoning-or "thinking like a lawyer" in the narrow cognitive
sense-through use of the "signature pedagogy" of the Socratic case
method. 82 Students will also take several required and elective courses
addressing practical skills. In addition, they will take a first-year required course called The Legal Profession, and an upper-class required

77. For Snow's discussion of the first paradigm of virtue acquisition, see Snow, supra
note 14, at 136, 137-42; see also supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (for earlier discussion of Snow's first paradigm in this Article).
78. Floyd, supranote 75, at 195-96, 216-25.
79. For Snow's discussion of her second paradigm, see Snow, supranote 14, at 142-49.
80. This includes those of us at Mercer who have already articulated detailed accounts
of the lawyer's practical wisdom and the particular qualities upon which it draws. See Jack
L. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, 53 MERCER L. REV. 985, 985-86 (2002); Jones, Perspectives, supra note 64, at 992-1039; Floyd, supra note 75, at 202-16. Many useful resources
for enhancing understanding of practical wisdom in general and professional practical wisdom (including lawyerly practical wisdom) in particular are being generated by the Center
for Practical Wisdom, established at the University of Chicago in 2016. For further details,
see http://wisdomcenter.uchicago.edul.
81. See Mercer Law School Required Courses 2015-16, MERCER LAW SCH.,
http://law.mercer.edulacademics/registrar/required-courses-2015- 16.cfm (last visited Feb.
2, 2017); Mercer Law School Course Descriptions, MERCER LAW SCHOOL,
http://www2.law.mercer.edulcourses/ (last visited Feb 2, 2017).
82. For discussion of this signature pedagogy, see SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at
47-56. Mercer students may also take one or more elective courses providing various kinds
of "perspectives" on the law.
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course on the ethical rules of professional conduct called Law of Lawyering, both of which focus on moral knowledge and skills and qualities of
moral character. Students may also choose to obtain some integrative experiential education by enrolling in a clinic or externship course for credit
(as opposed to a paid internship that is not part of the curriculum). There
are also opportunities for students to have further integrative curricular
experiences such as Law Review or Moot Court. In accordance with recent changes in the ABA law school accreditation requirements, Mercer
will now require all its students, not just some, to undergo meaningful
experiential learning.88
How, specifically, does this curriculum help Mercer law students develop virtues, including the "master virtue" of practical wisdom? We will
consider Nancy Snow's three paradigms of virtue acquisition in turn. Although we will not address the matter in depth here, we should notice
that the identification of more particular lawyerly virtues implicates the
relationship between narrower dispositions or virtues and more general
virtues. Thus, exercising "local" lawyerly virtues (differentiated by the
lawyer's role) may be dependent upon, presuppose, and indeed incorporate more general virtues such as diligence, conscientiousness, perseverance, empathy, respect for others, resilience, integrity, honesty, justice,
temperance, and courage. 84 Again, the following discussion is intended

83. See AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS 2016-2017 (2017), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal-education/resources/
standards.html. Standard 303 (a) (3) requires each student to receive at least six hours of
experiential education (simulation course, clinical course, field placement, or a combination
of these), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublications/misc/legal-education/
Standards/2016_2017_standardschapter3.authcheck.dam.pdf. For the effective date of
this requirement, see ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
GUIDANCE MEMO: TRANSITION TO AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW STANDARDS AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AUGUST 13, 2014, http://www.american

bar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legal-educationandadmissions-to-the-bar/gov
ernancedocuments/2014_august transitionandimplementation of new aba standards_
andrules.authcheck.dam.pdf (requirement applies beginning with the entering class in AY
2016-17).publications/misc/legal.education/Standards/2016 2017_aba standards and rul
es-of procedure.authcheckdam.pdf (requirement applies beginning with the entering class
in AY 2016-17).
84. For a good discussion of many of these virtues and others for good lawyering, see,
for example, LINDER & LEVIT, supra note 2. Regarding courage, the authors notably distinguish physical courage, moral courage, and psychological courage; see id. at 36-37, 4754. See also Larry 0. Natt, Gantt II & Benjamin V. Madison III, Teaching Knowledge,
Skills, and Values of ProfessionalIdentity Formation, in BUILDING ON BEST PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD 253, 254-60 (Deborah Ma-

ranville et al. eds., 2015) (referring to various virtues as "values") [hereinafter BUILDING
ON BEST PRACTICES].
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not as an exhaustive and comprehensive account of how Mercer law students develop virtue, but as suggestive and illustrative.85
1. First Paradigm: Non-conscious development of virtuous
habits through "goal-dependent automaticity" 86
As we have already discussed in Part I Section B above, in Nancy
Snow's first paradigm of virtue acquisition, people develop virtue through
automatic or non-conscious processing while consciously aiming at something else; and although Snow does not use the term herself, one can say
that virtue supervenes upon those actions that are done with another goal
in mind.87 Consequently, just as forms of moral virtues such as justice,
courage, and truthfulness must necessarily supervene upon a legal education for the reasons discussed in Part I Section B, virtues of performance character such as diligence, conscientiousness, curiosity, love of
learning, perseverance, and deferred gratification must also supervene
upon a legal education. If they do not, then the prospects of success at
law school are significantly diminished. It might seem, though, that the
virtues of moral character could only be significantly otherwise developed
by courses such as The Legal Profession and Law of Lawyering that explicitly address ethical and moral issues (see discussion of Snow's second
paradigm below for discussion of The Legal Profession course) as well as
by integrative lawyering experiences in clinical courses and externships
(see discussion of Snow's third paradigm below for discussion of our externship program). After all, most other courses are explicitly concerned

Following Christine Swanton's lead, we can also ask whether the development and exercise of "local" lawyerly virtues thereby contributes to the further development of these
more general virtues and whether development of both local virtues and general virtues
occurs along a continuum of virtue development. See supra notes 42, 45, 66. Moreover, to
the extent the further development of more general virtues occurs non-consciously, including when consciously seeking to develop local lawyerly virtues as in the second paradigm
discussed below, this is presumably another instance of the first paradigm of non-conscious
development of virtuous habits through goal-dependent automaticity.
85. Michael McGinnis identifies "[i]nteractive classroom dialogue and simulated client
problems, participation in law school clinical education classes, work performed in internships and externships, summer associate or law clerk positions, and other forms of experiential learning" as "experiences during law school that offer [law students] occasions to
practice the lawyerly virtues and fortify their character for making good and moral decisions when they are ultimately admitted to the bar" and that "provide excellent opportunities for students to develop good habits for the practice of law." McGinnis, Virtue Ethics,
supra note 2, at 39.
86. For Snow's discussion of this first paradigm of virtue acquisition, see Snow, supra
note 14, at 136-37, 137-42.
87. Supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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with developing doctrinal knowledge and analytical or practical skills.
But appearances can be deceiving.
Although these other courses are concerned with the conscious acquisition of doctrinal knowledge and skills necessary for lawyerly practical
wisdom and expertise-in this way, they are resonant with Snow's second paradigm-they also serve to develop or further develop many important moral and intellectual virtues (in addition to the performance
character virtues mentioned above). These virtues also necessarily supervene upon a law student's participation in the classroom experience
88
outside of students' and even professors' conscious awareness. Following Snow, such virtue development occurs as the student pursues the
goal of succeeding in the particular course on the way to becoming a lawyer; imitates modeling by the professor, other students, or both; and fol89
lows guidance and instruction by the professor.
Consider, for example, the Socratic case method of teaching. This
method involves "an interactive reading of [appellate] cases with each
reading further refined by hypotheticals designed to test each reading
and sometimes accompanied by a sequencing of cases in which a more
refined rule emerges."90 Anthony Kronman explains how, in addition to
doctrinal knowledge and analytical and rhetorical skills, the Socratic
91
case method serves to develop a law student's moral imagination. Spede"sympathetic
cifically, the method develops the student's capacity for
for
apcapacity
tachment," which is a composite skill/virtue (because the
propriate empathy combined with appropriate detachment requires both

88. Virtue development might also supervene upon various extra-curricular activities
during law school as students interact with one another in various student organizations.
89. See Snow, supra note 14, at 138-42, for explication of the processes involved. Snow
summarizes the overall process as follows:
[This] model of virtue acquisition explains how ordinary "folk"-people not directly or explicitly concerned with becoming virtuous, can, nonetheless, develop
virtuous dispositions. In this model, people are not directly motivated to become
virtuous, but instead, are directly motivated to become something, such as a good
parent or a good teacher, for which virtue is required. They develop virtue indirectly, through the pursuit of other goals, the emulation of role models, or the
enactment of practical advice.
Id. at 142. Moreover, emulating role models or enacting practical advice can to a large extent themselves be seen as being undertaken in pursuit of the relevant goals. Id. at 140-41.
In connection with this first paradigm, Snow does not discuss students, but she does discuss
teachers, explaining that those aspiring to be good teachers "are conscientious about class
preparation, care about their students, and are fair and even-handed in grading, calling on
students in class, and so on." Id. at 138.
90. Jack Sammons, Confronting the Three Apprenticeships, in TOWARD HUMAN
FLOURISHING, supra note 6, at 156-57 n.12.
91. KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 110-21.
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perceptual habits and dispositions). 92 Importantly, Kronman considers
the habitual bifocal capacity for sympathetic detachment to be the core
of practical wisdom.93 The case method develops this core capacity because it "presents students with a series of concrete disputes and compels
them to reenact these disputes by playing the roles of the original contestants or their lawyers" and then "a moment later .. . [t]o . .. reexamine
the case from a disinterested judicial point of view." 94 In this way the
Socratic case method also develops the virtue of civic mindedness in the
form of a concern for "the administration of justice," for "the integrity or
well-being of the legal system as a whole," for "the good of the community
represented by the laws."95 It develops this public spirited concern for the
well-being of the law because it prioritizes the role of the judge and gives
students "constant practice at playing it" so that "[b]y a process of transference . .. the judicial attitude that a student begins by mimicking becomes to some degree his own. . . ."96
Somewhat similarly, Jack Sammons explains that the Socratic case
method develops "the virtue of seeing good arguments on both sides" as
well as "a certain tolerance of ambiguities, contingencies, and an unspoken respect for that within the law that points beyond us."97 Hypothesizing a community group composed of members of different professions addressing a difficult and complex problem facing the community,
Sammons gives a fuller sense of the particular "virtues" or "habits of
thought and manners of being" of the good lawyer that are developed by
repeated immersion in the Socratic method classroom experience.98 For

92. Id. at 113-16.
93. Id. at 66-77, 87.
94. Id. at 113.
95. Id. at 116-21.
96. Id. at 118-19. Kronman explains that the judge's concern for the well-being of the
law includes, for example, "concern for doctrinal coherence, . . . for the responsiveness of
doctrine to social and economic circumstances[,] [and] for the bonds of fellowship that legal
conflict strains but that must be preserved to avoid other, more destructive conflicts." Id.
at 118.
97. Sammons, Confronting the Three Apprenticeships, supra note 90, at 156-57 n.12.
98. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, supra note 80, at 985-86.
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Sammons the practice of lawyering is a rhetorical practice within the ancient tradition of rhetoric,99 and these virtues are essential for the practical wisdom of the lawyer as rhetorician. 0 0 They include:
* The ability to recognize what is shared in competing positions;
* An attentiveness to detail, especially linguistic detail;
* An attentiveness as well to the ambiguities of language;
* A use of these ambiguities both for structuring the conversation and
analyzing the issue;
* A focus on text and a markedly different sense of its restraint;
* A rhetorical awareness of the reactions of potential audiences to each
competing position and even to each argument;
* An imaginative anticipation of future disputes;
* A realistic assessment of the situation, even as a partisan in it;
* A recognition of the persuasive elements of all positions, especially
those in opposition to the lawyer's own;
* A very particular form of honesty;
* An insistence on practicality combined with an acceptance of complexity;
* A shying away from broad principles and "proud words";
* A concern with the procedures by which decisions are to be made;
* An equal concern with the quality of the roundtable conversation
itself including a concern that all voices round the table be well heard
and considered; and
* An evaluation of positions in terms of an objective hypothetical authoritative decision-maker who serves as stand-in for social judgment,
and, thus, a consideration of each proposed course of action from a particular social perspective. 101

99. Jack L. Sammons, The Radical Ethics of Legal Rhetoricians, 32 VAL. U. L. REV.
93, 94 (1997). Specifically, "legal rhetoric is a particular form of rhetoric located within a
particular rhetorical community with its own particular culture. Thus, lawyering is a particular rhetorical practice with its own unique set of excellences. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
100. See Linda L. Berger, A Rhetorician's PracticalWisdom, 66 MERCER L. REV. 459,
469-70 (2015) (discussing Sammons' account of these virtues).
101. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, supra note 80, at 985-86. For two recent illuminating discussions that reveal the operation of these virtues in the exercise of the lawyer-rhetorician's practical wisdom, see Berger, supra note 100, at 469-81 (applying these virtues
to the decisions by lower court judges seeking to decide the constitutionality of gun regulation after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Districtof Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008)) and Edwards, supra note 50 (analyzing the primary defense brief challenging the
constitutionality of the death penalty in the consolidated cases known as Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) in terms that can also be viewed very effectively through the lens
of these virtues as well as through the lens of the four cardinal virtues).
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Although Kronman and Sammons may be describing ideals as much
as realities,1 02 their claims are resonant with Mark Roche's account of
how various intellectual and moral virtues necessarily develop through
proper participation in college classes and related intellectual pursuitS. 103 Several of these virtues are additional virtues, beyond those vir-

tues already identified above, that ideally develop further during a legal
education:
* Temperance (by renouncing other pleasures to prepare well);
* A particular form of justice (by entertaining the views of others);
* Respect for others and for truth (by engaging in the give and take of
discussion);
* Intellectual hospitality (by actively drawing in others and their
ideas);
* Diplomacy (by challenging others' views without personal attacks);
* Humility (by recognizing deficiencies in one's own positions);
* Civil courage (by adhering to an unpopular position when convinced
it is valid);
* Honesty and integrity (by following the evidence even against interest);
* Discipline and perseverance (by thoroughly thinking through an issue);

* Capacity for flexibility and self-overcoming (by being willing to abandon beliefs in the light of the evidence); and
* Patience and striving (by continuing efforts when tentative answers
are inadequate). 104

102. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supranote 9, at 56-58 (canvassing various perceived serious
shortcomings in the Socratic method). However, in his contribution to this Symposium volume, Sammons takes the Socratic case method to another level in which law teachers would
immerse students imaginatively in the world of practice by "at least conceptually" locating
them within, and having them explore, the web of relationships connected to the case and
the opinion. Sammons, supra note 67, at 762-64. Perhaps one can think of this approach as
a hybrid one that combines the first paradigm of virtue acquisition with important elements
of the third paradigm and potentially perhaps even of the second paradigm as well.
103. Mark W. Roche, Should Faculty Members Teach Virtues and Values? That Is the
Wrong Question, 95 LIBERAL EDUC. 32, 34-35 (Summer 2009).
104. See id. (discussing these virtues). Roche explains, moreover, how success at college
and beyond is impeded by the lack of certain character virtues and the presence of corresponding vices such as arrogance (leading to dismissal of worthy arguments), defensiveness
or becoming emotional (clouding thought), disproportionate indulgence in worldly things
(distracting from necessary focus and concentration), complacency (avoiding necessary effort and discipline), greed (elevating external recognition and sometimes even tempting to
dishonesty and fabrication), and lack of motivation (lessening chances for learning or employment). Id. at 35.
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2. Second Paradigm: Conscious development of virtuous habits
05
modeled on acquisition of practical skill or expertise
In Nancy Snow's second paradigm of virtue development, modeled on
the acquisition of practical skill or expertise, virtue is consciously cultivated in that "virtue is explicitly being inculcated by those who want to
be virtuous and by their mentors."106 The second paradigm, then, "explains virtue acquisition as a kind of apprenticeship or tutelage by means
07
of which one cultivates, and is mentored into, the practice of virtue."
As my colleagues Pat Longan and Tim Floyd explain, Mercer is very intentional about cultivating our students' legal professionalism and the
qualities that are central to it.1os Thus, "[w]e have explicitly placed character development and the formation of professional identity at the core
of our curriculum."10 9 The way we do so offers a striking example of this
second paradigm of virtue acquisition.
The process begins in earnest with a required course, The Legal Profession, that all Mercer students take in the spring semester of their first
year. This course begins to develop the moral knowledge, moral skills and
practical wisdom, and particular lawyerly virtues that are central to lawyer professionalism (and a sound application of the ethical rules of professional conduct).110 Online lectures and assigned readings give the students basic moral knowledge. They learn about the five lawyerly virtues

105. For Snow's discussion of this second paradigm of virtue acquisition, see Snow, supra note 14, at 136-37, 142-48.
106. Id. at 143.
107. Id. at 149.
108. The focus here is on Mercer's innovative and distinctive Legal Profession course,
created and directed by Pat Longan, and on its innovative and distinctive Externship Program (formerly Public Interest Program), created and directed by Timothy Floyd. See Patrick E. Longan, Teaching Professionalism, 60 MERCER L. REV. 659 (2009) (describing the
Legal Profession course as it had evolved through 2009); Timothy Floyd, Moral Vision,
Moral Courage, and the Formation of the Lawyer's Professional Identity, 28 Miss. C. L.
REV. 339 (2009) (describing the Legal Profession course and the Public Interest Program
as they had evolved through 2009); Patrick Longan & Timothy Floyd, Mercer Law School's
Focus on Professionalism, 2 BLOOMBERG L. REP.-STUDENT ED., no. 1, at 13 (Jan. 31,
2011) (describing both courses as they had evolved through 2011); Patrick E. Longan, Further Reflections on Teaching Professionalism: A Thank You Note to Jack Sammons, 66
MERCER L. REV. 513 (2015) (describing the Legal Profession course as it has evolved
through 2015) [hereinafter Longan, Further Reflections]; First Year Course on Professionalism, MERCER LAW SCH., http://law.mercer.edulacademics/centers/clep/education.cfm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
109. Longan & Floyd, supra note 108, at 13.
110. Pat Longan describes the goals of the course as follows:
First, we are sensitizing students to issues of professionalism so that when they
enter the practice they will know one when they see it "in the wild." One cannot
deal with an issue to which one is blind. Second, we are motivating the students
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of commitment to competence, fidelity to client, fidelity to law and legal
institutions, civility, and public service (including pro bono service);ln
how these five virtues are drawn from the best traditions of the practice
and are reflected in relevant statements on professionalism such as those
adopted by the Georgia Bar and the Florida Bar; 1 12 and how being intrinsically motivated to practice virtue (rather than extrinsically motivated
by, for example, the desire for money) is related to a lawyer's satisfaction,
happiness, and flourishing.113 They also learn why it matters to others
and to society that lawyers fulfill these expectations, how their ability to
do so can be challenged in various ways in different practice settings, 114
to make decisions that are consistent with the values of the profession. Lawyers
need reasons to do the right thing, especially when doing the wrong thing might
be easier or more lucrative. Third, we are beginning the process of training the
students to make and implement wise decisions when professional values are at
stake. Eventually, every lawyer must be able to answer the hard questionswhat should I do and how should I do it?-and we are helping our students start
to learn how to do that.
Longan, FurtherReflections, supranote 108, at 513-14.
111. The analytical framework provided by these five virtues can be used to group and
organize additional specific qualities of character identified in various accounts, including
those identified in two influential ABA Reports, the 1992 MacCrate Committee Report and
the 1996 Professionalism Committee Report. For further discussion of this point, see Jones,
Perspectives, supra note 64, at 999-1000.
112. See STATE BAR OF GEORGIA, LAWYER'S CREED AND AsPIRATIONAL STATEMENT ON
PROFESSIONALISM,
http://www.gabar.org/aboutthebar/lawrelatedorganizations/cjcp/lawy
ers-creed.cfm; FLORIDA BAR, PROFESSIONALISM EXPECTATIONS, https://www.floridabar.
org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/1ACF11084FDADAA285257DE7006B5511/$FIL
E/Professionalism%20Expectations.pdf?OpenElement. One intriguing question concerns
the extent to which a self-regulated profession such as the legal profession, which has defined these norms of virtue, possesses the characteristics of Hayek's "spontaneous order"
discussed by Mark LeBar. See LeBar, supra note 49, at 277-88.
113. This is perhaps at least a partial answer to Christian Miller's worry about how we
can motivate people to want to cultivate virtue in a sustained manner in the first place, at
least in the context of professional education. See Miller, supra note 16, at 172-73. Put pithily, and hopefully not crassly, we want the students to understand that the motivation for
becoming a virtuous phronimos is selfish, but selfish in the best sense. The power of this
motivation to reinforce virtue is also recognized by Rachana Kamtekar. See Kamtekar, supra note 42, at 197-99.
114. Confronting law students with real world practice situations that create pressures
and temptations to compromise the lawyerly virtues and thus lawyer professionalism and
having them consciously face up to these realities makes them aware of the struggle against
"corrupting influences" that Christine Swanton notes. Swanton, supra note 32, at 129. It is
also an effective strategy for helping inoculate them against the many non-virtuous dispositions that may operate unconsciously when triggered by situational factors in practice as
discussed by Christian Miller. See Miller, supranote 16, at 157-63. Indeed, Miller appears
to advocate a strategy of "getting the word out" himself. Id. at 168-72. However, care is
needed here. Thus, in the early years of the course this aspect was perhaps presented less
artfully than it is nowadays, and students nicknamed the course "Legal Depression." For
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and how existing mechanisms for enforcing lawyer professionalism are
inadequate. In addition, the students learn about the moral skills and
the practical wisdom they will need to instantiate the five virtues and to
meet these challenges in concrete situations. Specifically, they are introduced to Rest and Narvaez's account of the FCM, identifying the four
moral skills or capacities of moral sensitivity, moral reasoning or judgment, moral motivation, and moral implementation that are central to
"mature moral functioning" or practical wisdom. 115 They are also introduced to Schwartz and Sharpe's account of practical wisdom and its underlying psychology,11 6 and their account of the six "moral abilities" of the
practically wise person and of why practical wisdom is important in pro-

additional suggestive discussion of how "[m]oral identity can be .. . activated or deactivated
by situational press," see Lapsley, supra note 19, at 45, 46-47, 48-49, 54; see also id. at 50,
54-56 (discussing the "dark side" of moral identity and the phenomena of moral credentialing and moral licensing, as well as moral cleansing).
115. See, e.g., Darcia Narvaez, Wisdom as Mature Moral Functioning:Insights from Developmental Psychology and Neurobiology, in TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING, supra note
6, at 35-37. It should be noted that what was said above about the relationship between
local virtues and more general virtues, supra note 84 and accompanying text, can also be
said about the relationship of these four moral skills or capacities and more general character virtues. See id. at 36-37 (identifying several such virtues within the elements of the
FCM). The reader will also notice the resonance between these four moral skills or capacities and the first four elements or features in the set identified in my schematic account of
practical wisdom, supra note 49 and accompanying text. For an illuminating discussion
illustrating how these four moral skills or capacities operate when exercising lawyerly practical wisdom, see Floyd, supra note 75, at 196-99, 208-11. For more detailed discussion of
the FCM in this volume, see Muriel J. Bebeau, Stephen J. Thoma & Clark D. Cunningham,
EducationalProgramsfor ProfessionalIdentity Formation: The Role of Social Science Research, 68 MERCER L. REV. 591, 598-608 (2017); Elizabeth C. Vozzola, The Case for the
Four Component Model vs. Moral Foundations Theory: A Perspective from Moral Psychology, 68 MERCER L. REV. 633, 640-43 (2017). For another excellent account written for a
legal audience, see Clark Cunningham, Learning ProfessionalResponsibility, in BUILDING
ON BEST PRACTICES, supra note 84, at 282-89. While acknowledging its great value for
legal educators, Vozzola cautions against an exclusive focus on the FCM and advocates an
integrative approach that also includes Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), which identifies
at least six "innate psychological systems that constitute intuitive ethical foundations."
Vozzola, supra, at 635, 643-47. Bebeau and her co-authors, however, are critical of this
suggestion and consider that the FCM already adequately addresses unconscious intuitions. Bebeau et al., supra, at 620-21, 624.
116. Barry Schwartz & Kenneth Sharpe, PracticalWisdom: Aristotle Meets Positive Psychology, 7 J. HAPPINESS STUDIES 377 (2006).
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fessional life, how it is threatened by the unwise use of rules and incentives, and how it can be defended in professional life and professional
education. 117
With regard to the actual development of these moral skills and practical wisdom, and of the five lawyerly virtues, the lectures and readings
on the preceding topics already begin to develop the students' moral sensitivity. The several other pedagogies employed in the course serve to
further develop moral sensitivity and also to develop the other moral
skills in a kind of cumulative "layering" process. Each week, the students
discuss various assigned readings or exercises in several separate small
discussion sections of twenty-five to thirty students, for which they prepare in groups of three or four. The students first consider case studies
in which they identify pertinent issues of professionalism, discuss why
the lawyers concerned acted in a way that failed to live up to the professional ideals, and explore possible alternatives they might have taken.
This experience not only further develops the students' moral sensitivity;
it also begins to develop their capacity for moral reasoning or judgment.
Development of this latter skill then continues through a series of "practical wisdom" exercises involving hypothetical situations in which the
students role-play and "practice the skills of reasoning and decision-making, under conditions of conflicting values . .. and uncertainty.""U 8 These
exercises develop the "moral judgment" component of practical wisdom.
Pat Longan elaborates:
The students ... need to acquire the skills to make a wise decision and
chart a prudent course when values conflict and they are surrounded
by uncertainty. For example, in a particular situation the virtue of civility may compromise the virtue of fidelity to the client. In another,
fidelity to the client may appear to conflict with a duty to the law or
the courts. Students can make and implement decisions about professionalism only if they know how, and learning how is all about learning the master virtue, practical wisdom.

. .

. [A]1though one cannot

teach wisdom, wisdom can be learned. One learns wisdom by trying to
make wise decisions, by exploring what decisions others would make,

&

117. For this accoint, see Schwartz & Sharpe, War on Wisdom, supranote 57; see also
SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM, supra note 59. The six "moral abilities" include the ability to attend to the particular circumstances, to find the mean, to improvise,
to empathize, to aim at the right things, and to draw on experience, take initiative, and
learn from mistakes. Schwartz & Sharpe, War on Wisdom, supra, at 176-77; SCHWARTZ
SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM, supra, at 39-41.

118. Longan & Floyd, supra note 108, at 13.
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by reflecting on those decisions with experienced practitioners, and by
doing it again . .. with a new and harder problem.1 19
Each discussion section also has its own blog, to which the students
are required to post an informal reflection every week about what they
are learning in response to a prompt, and this is another vehicle for developing their moral sensitivity and moral judgment. Throughout the semester the entire class attends a series of "Inside the Legal Profession"
interviews conducted by Pat Longan with lawyers, judges, and other legal professionals who are exemplars of legal professionalism. Moreover,
as the semester progresses, small groups of three or four students interview an experienced lawyer about that lawyer's life in the law and each
student also reads a biography or autobiographyabout a famous lawyer
or judge chosen from a provided list. During the final two weeks the students talk about these individual interviews and books in their small discussion sections. These various encounters with real-life lawyers and
judges who find happiness and fulfillment by living and practicing as exemplars of professionalism help to develop the students' moral motivation and moral implementation skills. 120
By the end of the course, the students have begun to internalize the
five particular lawyerly virtues we seek to cultivate as well as the moral
skills or capacities and the practical wisdom they need to live up to these

119. Longan, FurtherReflections, supra note 108, at 521-22, 525. For a description and
analysis of one of these exercises, involving the "classic problem" of "scrivener's error" by
the attorney for the other party favoring the lawyer's client and thus an apparent conflict
between the virtue of fidelity to the client and the virtue of civility, see id. at 522-24. For
another good example, involving the impetuous testator and thus apparent conflicting values within the virtue of fidelity to the client, see LINDER & LEVIT, supra note 2, at 188-91.
The authors discuss four different models of lawyer-client relationship for the role of lawyer
as counselor (client victory, client autonomy, client rectitude, and client goodness), endorsing the model of client goodness in which the lawyer engages the client in moral conversation with the goal of helping the client determine his or her true interests, which also embrace the client's relationships within the communities to which the client belongs. Id. at
191-203. In order to do this well the lawyer "requires empathy, patience, experience, and
sometimes a dose of humility," as well as "wisdom." Id. at 193, 285. For a sophisticated
discussion of what the practically wise and virtuous lawyer should do when apparent moral
dilemmas cannot be dissolved, for example, through moral conversation with the client, so
the lawyer is compelled to do something immoral anyway, see Hursthouse, supra note 2, at
247-53 (proposing that the lawyer should resolve the dilemma and act in a distinctively
virtuous way "with all the extra doings that entails" and should also "go the extra mile for
justice," for example, by engaging in pro bono work, law reform efforts, or efforts to secure
improvement or stricter enforcement of the disciplinary rules).
120. In 2014, the ABA Standing Committee on Professionalism awarded Mercer the
Gambrell Professionalism Award for the "Inside the Legal Profession" series. Longan, Further Reflections, supra note 108, at 520.
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ideals as a lawyer-phronimos would in concrete practice situations. Traditionally we have measured this internalization on the final examination, which is Pass/Fail (it would be perverse to send a message that virtue and professionalism are motivated by external rewards such as
grades), and by comparing the reflection paper the students write about
their perception of professionalism at the very beginning of the course
with the reflection paper they write on the same topic at the end of the
course. In spring 2015 we started to use two additional instruments at
the beginning and at the end of the course-the Defining Issues Test
(first developed by James Rest in 1979) and an Ethical Dilemma Survey-and will be analyzing the resulting data. 121
We continue to build on the foundation laid in The Legal Profession
course by explicit reference to the lessons of that course in other courses
such as the Externship course to which we now turn.
3. Third Paradigm: Conscious development of virtuous habits
through the Confucian way of the junzil 22
Although Nancy Snow's third paradigm of virtue acquisition through
habituation is "akin to [the second paradigm's] model of apprenticeship
in virtue, it takes us a step beyond it by conceptualizing apprenticeship
in virtue as structured immersion in a way of life." 123 Specifically,

121. These instruments focus on measuring the moral reasoning component of the FCM.
Clearly, we will also want to consider using or adapting those instruments for measuring
other components in the FCM and related traits that are identified in various contributions
to this Symposium volume, including the Professional Role Orientation Inventory (PROI)
and the Professional Identity Essay (PIE), as well as several other measures. For explanation of all these various measures, see Bebeau et al., supranote 115, at 602-08, 623-24, 62831; Hamilton, supra note 3. Perhaps we might also consider using the Moral Foundations
Questionnaire (MFQ) described by Vozzola to identify our students' unconscious intuitions,
although the utility and appropriateness of this measure for legal educators are questioned
by Bebeau and her co-authors. Vozzola, supra note 115, at 634-35; Bebeau et al., supra note
115, at 621-22.
It is intriguing to consider whether we might also be able to use or adapt the Prosocial
Tendencies Measure (addressing the relative influence of justice-based moral reasoning
and compassion-based benevolence in predicting altruistic and other pro-social behaviors)
discussed by Gustavo Carlo and Alexandra Davis, to help measure this internalization. For
discussion of this instrument, see Gustavo Carlo & Alexandra N. Davis, Benevolence in a
Justice Based World: The Power of Sentiments (and Reasoning) in PredictingProsocialBehaviors, in DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES, supra note 7, at 262-64. We may also be able to
mine various instruments for measuring aspects of wisdom identified by the Center for
Practical Wisdom at the University of Chicago. See http://wisdomcenter.uchicago.edu/Are
te/WisdomToolsl6.aspx. See also supranote 80 (further discussing the Center).
122. For Snow's discussion of this third paradigm of virtue acquisition, see Snow, supra
note 14, at 137, 149-51.
123. Id. at 150.
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"[u]nder the master's guidance, the junzi-to-be .. . learns how to act well
across a range of different situation-types, each calling for behaviors and
attitudes in accordance with exacting standards." 124 Thus, "[t]he creation
of the Confucian exemplary person, the junzi, requires total immersion
and conscious thought about the situations in which one is placed." 125 It
is "a more global form of virtue development" than either the first or the
second paradigm. 126 This third paradigm is clearly relevant to understanding the cultivation of virtue by mentors in the legal apprenticeship
that was the most prevalent form of legal education during the early history of the Republic. 127 Moreover, the "total immersion and conscious
thought about the situations in which one is placed" 128 is an apt characterization of the type of experiential education that many Mercer students receive in our elective Externship program. In this program, second- and third-year students earn course credits for fieldwork that is
typically in a public service placement such as a government office, a nonprofit entity, or even a private law office provided the student is working
on matters that are for non-profit clients, pro bono, or at a reduced fee.1 29

124. Id.
125. Id. at 152.
126. Id. at 151.
127. For discussion of the cultivation of the professional ideal of the lawyer-statesman
and its component character virtues in such legal apprenticeships, see Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education:An Historical Framework-A History
of U.S. Legal Education PhaseI: From the Foundingof the Republic Until the 1860s, 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1041, 1059-65, 1152-53, 1159-61 (2006). For a description of the lawyerstatesman ideal and its inter-related character virtues of practical wisdom and civic mindedness, see id. at 1121-28.
128. Snow, supra note 14, at 152; see also supra note 125 and accompanying text (quoting this language).
129. The account given here will focus on the Externship I course; students may follow
this with Externship II in which traditionally there has been no classroom component, although this has changed with AY 2015-16. Historically, in Externship I the students have
been able to earn three or four credit hours for a semester long externship. If they have.
wished to earn two or three more externship hours, they have then taken Externship II.
However, beginning in AY 2014-15, we now supplement this model with a "Semester-inAtlanta" program in which third-year students can earn up to twelve credit hours for externship and take additional law school courses at Mercer University's Atlanta campus. We
hope to extend this model to externships elsewhere as well, including in Macon. Moreover,
beginning in AY 2014-15 we also expanded the field placements in our externship program
beyond public service to include corporate counsel placements in the legal departments of
various private corporations. For a detailed discussion of Mercer Law School's Externship
program, see Timothy W. Floyd & Kendall L. Kerew, Marking the Path from Law Student
to Lawyer: Using Field Placement Courses to Facilitatethe Deliberate Explorationof Professional Identity and Purpose, 68 MERCER L. REV. 767, 774, 776-87, 807-22 (2017).
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As in any externship or internship experience, students are able to develop and integrate their theoretical knowledge, skills, and qualities of
character, and to grow further towards acquiring the master virtue of
lawyerly practical wisdom through their "total immersion" in actual practice as they work under the guidance of their field placement supervisors.
What is so noteworthy about an externship program such as Mercer's,
however, is the role of the faculty supervisors in guiding the students'
130
We
"conscious thought about the situations in which [they are] placed."
divide the students into two sections of up to fifteen students, each representing a diverse mix of placements and each with a faculty supervisor.
The faculty guidance occurs in a robust weekly classroom component (twohour weekly meetings during which we usually discuss various general
131
topics in the first hour and then hold case rounds in the second hour)
and also through an equally robust weekly reflective journaling requirement. And this guidance is very intentionally focused on the further development of professionalism and its virtues. Thus, "[w]e designed the
program to build upon the emphasis on professionalism that is at the
1 32
heart of our curriculum."
More specifically, regarding the classroom general topics, early on in
the course we invite the students to deeply reflect on the question of authenticity: "Can I be the person I truly am and also be a good lawyer?"
The aim is to "help them to develop their own professional identity, that

For an excellent account of how externship programs, such as the Mercer program described here, help law students integrate doctrinal knowledge and skills with ethical
knowledge, skills, values, and virtues, as well as personal values or virtues, see Daisy Hurst
Floyd & Timothy W. Floyd, Professional Identity and Formation, in LEARNING FROM
PRACTICE: A TEXT FOR EXPERIENTIAL LEGAL EDUCATION 685-97 (Leah Wortham, Alex-

ander Scherr, Nancy Maurer & Susan L. Brooks, eds., 3d. ed. 2016). This account resonates
with the discussion, supranote 51 and accompanying text, of the different types of qualities
or attributes that a professional phronimos accesses, draws upon, and conducts when exercising professional practical wisdom.
130. See Snow, supra note 14, at 152; see also supra notes 125, 128 and accompanying
text.
131. Sometimes both hours are devoted to the general topics. Beginning in AY 2013-14,
we have experimented successfully with team teaching the general topics in joint section
meetings, with separate section meetings for the case rounds, although our experience has
been that such team teaching becomes considerably more challenging as the class size in
the joint meetings approaches the maximum enrollment of thirty students. The resulting
dampening effect on group conversation suggests that separate sections may be preferable
for the first hour once the class size exceeds twenty to twenty-five students.
132. Longan & Floyd, supra note 108, at 14.
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is, to internalize the virtues of the legal profession so that they can practice with integrity." 33 We also introduce them to reflective learning theory pioneered by scholars such as Donald Schbnl3 4 and the habit of reflecting on the "reflection-in-action" that takes place in the moment when
tacit knowledge or "knowing-in-action" is insufficient to deal with unfamiliar situations, in order to improve performance over time and thus
gradually add to the stock of tacit knowledge. Reflecting on our past reflection-in-action, Sch6n discovered, is central to the development of true
expertise.1 35 The general topics addressed in subsequent weeks include
several different professionalism-related matters-balancing objectivity/detachment and empathy/compassion, balancing personal and professional life, challenging bias and discrimination, and further exploring the
nature of practical wisdom. We also examine model "hero" lawyers, both
fictional such as Atticus Finch and real such as Sir Thomas More. The
classroom case rounds enable guided group reflection on some of the general topics (and certain additional matters) but drawing now from the
students' own experiences, observations, and personal insights. In this
way, the students are also able to learn from one another both about how
these matters manifest in legal practice and about other aspects of different practice settings. In addition, guided individual reflection is enabled by the weekly journal submission, sometimes with an assigned
prompt but often undirected (although prompts are available if needed),
and by the section professor's personalized response to the submission.
In a special ceremony at the end of the year students who have taken two
or more experiential courses, including Externship, receive a certificate
of completion to mark their graduation from the relevant programs.136
At the end of the course (which like The Legal Profession course and
for the same reasons is Pass/Fail), we ask the students' placement supervisors to complete a final evaluation of their externs in the form of a detailed questionnaire inviting responses to targeted questions, including
some questions about virtues. In this way, and through the journaling
and class meeting (especially case rounds) requirements, we are able to
gauge the students' progress during their externships and, in Nancy
133. Id.
134. DONALD A. ScHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS
THINK IN ACTION (1983); DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE
PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE
PROFESSIONS (1987).

135. For a very useful summary discussion of Sch6n's reflective learning theory and the
process of professional improvement through reflection, see Floyd, supra note 75, at 21213.
136. These courses include Externship I, Externship II, and Clinic. For comparison of
Externship I and Externship II and the relationship between them, see supra note 129.
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Snow's words, the extent to which they have "learn[ed] how to act well
across a range of different situation-types, each calling for behaviors and
attitudes in accordance with exacting standards."1 37
4. Comparison with pedagogies in other professions
The Carnegie Foundation studies mentioned in the Introduction to
this Article 3 8 envisage professional training as moving the student
through three types of apprenticeships-the cognitive or intellectual apprenticeship (focused on theoretical knowledge and analytical skills), the
practical apprenticeship (focused on practical skills), and the socio-ethical apprenticeship (focused on values or virtues central to identity and
purpose). 139 Neil Hamilton, who follows the Carnegie Foundation in
equating "professional formation" with the third Carnegie apprenticeship, has undertaken a very useful comparison of the Foundation's five
studies on educating professionals (physicians, nurses, clergy, engineers,
and lawyers) and of the accounts they give of the elements of professional
formation and the particular pedagogies for developing them.1 40 He identifies twenty-three particular elements of professional formation (most of
which are professional character virtues) and examines both the common
(or largely common) and more profession-specific elements (and virtues)
emphasized in these five professional fields.141 Similarly, he identifies six

137. Snow, supranote 14, at 150; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text (quoting this language).
138. Supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
139. For discussion of these three "apprenticeships of professional preparation," see William Sullivan, Professionalism and Vocation Across the Professions, in TOWARD HUMAN
FLOURISHING, supra note 6, at 108-09; SULLIVAN, supra note 65, at 207-10. Analytical
constructs such as the three apprenticeships of professional education have heuristic value
but must be approached with caution because, as Jack Sammons and William May explain,
they risk dividing what may already be significantly integrated. See Sammons, Confronting
the Three Apprenticeships, supra note 90, at 150-59; William May, Forming Professionals
and the Quest for Common Ground in the University, in TOWARD HUMAN FLOURISHING,
supra note 6, at 118 n.6.
140. Neil Hamilton, FosteringProfessional Formation(Professionalism):Lessons from
the CarnegieFoundation'sStudies on Educating Professionals,45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 763
(2012). Hamilton also briefly discusses a sixth Carnegie Foundation study, published in
2011, addressing undergraduate business education. Id. at 782. For Hamilton's equation of
"professional formation" with the third Carnegie apprenticeship, see id. at 771-74. My own
usage of the term "professional formation" would seem to be broader, effectively encompassing development in all three apprenticeships and their integration with one another. See
supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
141. Hamilton, supra note 140, at 775-81. These elements include (in descending order
of degree of commonality):
internalization of deep responsibility to the person served;
competency and a commitment to excellence;
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particular pedagogies focused on the reflective exploration of meaning
and sixteen additional particular pedagogies that also promote professional formation, and again he examines the common (or largely common) and more profession-specific pedagogies emphasized in the five professional fields. 142
The six pedagogies for the reflective exploration of meaning include (in
descending order of commonality):
*
*
*
*
*
*

Reflection on the responsibilities of the profession;
Integrating the three apprenticeships;
Actively seeking feedback, dialogue, reflection, and self-assessment;
Broad curricular attention to professional formation;
Teacher-facilitated discussion of ethics; and
Relating content of discussions to each student's developmental

stage. 14 3

The sixteen additional pedagogies for promoting professional formation (which Hamilton notes can also promote development in the first

* moral reasoning;
* social responsibility to the community and to promotion of the public good;
* understanding interpersonal relationships;
* adherence to ethical codes;
* integrity;
* compassion;
* honesty and trustworthiness;
* professional formation related to the developmental stage of the student;
* accountability to employers, clients, and the public;
* aspiration to improve in all domains;
* civility;
* confidentiality;
* fairness;
* how to be in the world;
* loyalty;
* patient advocacy;
* promoting justice;
* religious commitment;
* respect for the suffering and the vulnerable;
* self-awareness; and
* acculturation.
Id.
142. Id. at 781-94.
143. Id. at 781-86.
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and second apprenticeships) include (again in descending order of commonality):
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Clinical education and practical experiences;
Coaching by faculty;
Modeling;
Institutional intentionality;
Supportive scaffolding;
Reflective writing;
Storytelling and narrative pedagogies;
Service learning and pro bono;
Small group discussion;
Case studies;
Heuristics providing analytical frameworks for case analysis;
Mentoring by other professionals;
Pedagogies of immersion in other cultures;
Pedagogies of interpretation and making judgments;
Simulated practice; and
Symbolic ceremonies and other events.1 44

What is remarkable about this identification of twenty-two pedagogies
is that, by my count, all but six (integrating the three apprenticeships;
clinical education and practical experiences; service learning and pro
bono; mentoring; immersion in other cultures; and symbolism) are employed in The Legal Profession course; all but three (case studies; simulated practice; and immersion in other cultures) are employed in the Externship course; and most of the omitted pedagogies would either not be
apposite or would be redundant in light of the other pedagogies used. 145

144. Id. at 786-94.
145. The use of multiple pedagogies in a course or curriculum finds significant support
in Gantt & Madison, supra note 84 (discussing multiple pedagogies for developing selfawareness, empathy, relational skills, reflective and decision-making skills, and the motivation to act consistently with decisions). Virtue theory may reveal some ways, however, in
which such use of multiple pedagogies is incoherent or otherwise dysfunctional and suggest
corresponding adjustments (I am indebted to Nancy Snow for drawing my attention to this
point). In any event, legal educators can surely draw very valuable lessons from the accounts of officer education in the military, medical education, and clergy education given in
other contributions to this Symposium volume. These accounts confirm the central importance of character and virtue development in professional formation (even when the
terms "character" and "virtue" may not be used explicitly) and they are instructive regarding the value of various types of pedagogies in promoting such development. See Lt. Col.
Benjamin Grimes, Keynote Address: 17th Annual Georgia Symposium on Ethics and Professionalism: October 6, 2016, 68 MERCER L. REV. 583 (2017); Sylvia R. Cruess & Richard
L. Cruess, From Teaching Professionalismto Supporting ProfessionalIdentity Formation:
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CONCLUSION

Nancy Snow's tripartite taxonomy of paradigms for virtue acquisition
through habituation-non-conscious development of virtuous habits
through "goal-dependent automaticity," conscious development of virtuous habits modeled on acquisition of practical skill or expertise, and conscious development of virtuous habits though the Confucian way of the
junzi-is very helpful in understanding virtue acquisition in the legal
profession and other professions.
Snow's first paradigm illuminates how members of the legal profession
and other professions unconsciously develop various virtues such as justice, courage, honesty, and humility by exercising a particular form of
these virtues in seeking to attain and sustain the internal goods or goods
of excellence of a professional practice. And all three paradigms serve to
organize thinking about the basic pedagogical approaches in professional
education, specifically legal education, that help students develop particular qualities or attributes, especially virtues, as well as the overarching
master virtue of practical wisdom that draws on and conducts these particular attributes in responding to particular situations of practice.
Snow's explanations of the non-conscious processing and of the moral
schemas and scripts that undergird each paradigm also illuminate what
is occurring psychologically in practitioners and students as they acquire
146
and exercise virtue and develop their moral selves or moral identities.
It is hoped, conversely, that the account in this Article will prove helpful
in confirming and illustrating Snow's tripartite taxonomy.
Similarly, as suggested in the Introduction, in several footnotes, and
by the Appendix below, the other contributions at the Notre Dame conference in May 2014 and in the Developing the Virtues book that it generated connect in many different ways to the work of legal educators and
other professional educators. These connections suggest a multitude of
lines of inquiry that could be the subject of fruitful conversation between
professional educators and virtue theorists working in the areas of moral
philosophy and cognitive and developmental psychology. Moreover, there

Lessons from Medicine, 68 MERCER L. REV. 665 (2017); Dr. Larry A. Golemon, Professional
Identity Formation Throughout the Curriculum: Lessons from Clergy Education, 68
MERCER L. REV. 649 (2017).
146. Snow addresses this non-conscious processing and these moral schemas and scripts
in the course of discussing each paradigm. See Snow, supra note 14, at 136-37, 139-42, 14448, 151-52. This description of the role of schemas and scripts also resonates with my own
treatment of the role of knowledge structures (schemas, scripts, cognitive maps, and paradigms) in preparing law school graduates for practice. See Mark L. Jones, Fundamental
Dimensions of Law and Legal Education: A Theoretical Framework, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 547, 612-17 (2001).
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are doubtless many other lines of inquiry relating to professional education in general and specific professional fields in particular that arise
from additional potential connections with work undertaken in these areas, with the work of clinicians (psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychotherapists), and with work undertaken in unrelated disciplines.1 47
These inquiries include epistemological inquiries regarding the nature
of tacit knowing and its acquisition through the learner's "indwelling" in
the practice and its multiple levels of reality; 148 conceptual inquiries
aimed at better understanding the nature of the particular virtues and
the professional practical wisdom we are seeking to develop in our students; and pedagogical inquiries enabling professional educators to evaluate better what works and what does not work, and why. It is very much
to be hoped, then, that we may look forward to more interdisciplinary
conversations in future conferences, building on the sound foundation
provided by initiatives such as the Notre Dame conference and the Developing the Virtues book and the exploration of professional identity in
this volume.

147. Thus, the potential connections and lines of inquiry will expand even further as
virtue theorists explore various other disciplines such as religion, sociology, political science, history, literary criticism, as well as additional critical or minority perspectives.
148. See, e.g., Sammons, Confronting the Three Apprenticeships, supra note 90, at 15359 (following Michael Polyani on this point).
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APPENDIX

The following are several sets of questions and concerns of interest to
professional educators addressed by the conference on "Virtue and Its
Development" held at the University of Notre Dame in May 2014 and the
book Developing the Virtues: Interdisciplinary Perspectives the conference generated: 149
150
A. First Set

uHow should we understand the phenomenological preconditions for
empathy, morality, and virtue that arise from our dialogic relations with
the community of being constituted by our world and our mutual consciousness?
mWhat can developmental psychologists tell us about the nature of
pre-moral capacities or sensibilities (such as understanding the intentions and emotions of others and internalizing values necessary for conscience development) that provide the foundations for moral behavior,
virtue, and moral identity?
mWhat can they tell us about ways to promote the healthy development of these capacities or sensibilities in infancy and childhood?
mWhat can they tell us about the consequences of disrupting these optimal developmental pathways and rectifying such disruptions when
they occur?
mWhat can they tell us about differences in basic ethical orientations
that may result from different childrearing practices and developmental
trajectories in the West and elsewhere?

149. For discussion of the conference and the book, see supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. The identification of these questions and concerns and their organization into four
sets are my own, and the conference organizers-and book editors-are not responsible for
any shortcomings in such identification and organization. For the editors' own identification of pertinent questions addressed at the conference and of "five interlocking themes"
unifying the book, see DEVELOPING THE VIRTUES, supra note 7, at 2-3. The editors describe
the latter as follows:
The themes are (1) general questions of how virtue development might begin in
early childhood and continue in the adult years; (2) questions of how extensive
virtue is (global or local), what obstacles must be overcome to extend virtue, and
how the development of virtue is best approached; (3) the nature of virtue and
how concepts and language affect how we think about and develop virtue; (4)
how early caregiving, the development of emotion, embodiment, and communities impact virtue development; and (5) the development of two specific virtues
long thought to be in tension: justice and benevolence.
Id. at 3.
150. See Stuart, supranote 16; Emde, supranote 16; Thompson, supranote 16; Narvaez,
supranote 16.
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B. Second Set151
*What is the nature of moral identity or the moral self? What is its
psychological basis?
mWhat are the respective roles of moral identity and situational factors
in influencing moral capacities and the exercise of virtue?
mWhat kinds of non-virtuous dispositions may operate unconsciously
when triggered by situational factors?
uGiven such factors, what are the strategies for cultivating virtue,
such as the generalization of narrow or local dispositions or virtues into
broader virtues, and for reinforcing the motivations to develop virtue?
C. Third Set1 52
mHow do virtue terms, including the term "good," differ from deontic
terms such as "right" or "wrong"?
mWhat is the relationship between fact and value, or descriptive aspects and evaluative aspects, in understanding the development of virtue?
mDoes virtue require practical wisdom or can children possess virtue?
mMore generally, is there a continuum of virtue development and what
is its nature?
mWithin this continuum, can virtue be differentiated according to
stage of life, social role (local virtue), cultural and historical situatedness,
or the particularities of a life?
mWhat is the relationship between differentiated virtue and "mature"
virtue?
mHow do the development and exercise of virtue and practical wisdom
compare to the development and exercise of expertise in skills?
mWhat are the ways in which we acquire virtue through habits, and
what are the respective roles of conscious and non-conscious processes in
such acquisition?
mWhat are the various forms of empathy, which form is necessary for
compassion and genuinely virtuous moral motivation, and what are the
roles of guilt and shame in helping to develop necessary empathy?

151. See Lapsley, supra note 67; Narvaez, supra note 16; Miller, supranote 16; Kamtekar, supra note 42.
152. See Annas, supra note 20; Swanton, supra note 32; Stichter, supra note 19; Snow,
supra note 14; Herdt, supra note 59.
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D. Fourth Set153
mHow far do norms of virtue, such as norms of justice, develop spontaneously within a particular social group?
mFrom what perspectives should we assess the judgment or practical
wisdom of moral agents in responding to such norms, and to what extent
does this judgment involve "seeing the world" in a virtuous way that calls
for certain responses?
mWhat are the relative contributions of principle-based moral reasoning founded on justice and fairness, of compassion-based moral sentiments such as benevolence, and of moral intuitions, in shaping moral development and motivating altruistic and other pro-social moral action?

153.

See LeBar, supra note 49; Carlo, supra note 121.
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